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　　防范和化解金融风险是金融市场的永恒主题。债券登记托管结算基础设施是防范债券市场重大金融风险的关键防线，也是债券市场高效稳健运行的根本保障。债券登记托管结算基础设施制度缺陷可能引发的风险，主要有多级托管导致的资产安全风险、主权安全风险、结算风险、操作风险以及数据安全风险。穿透式监管是防范金融市场风险的重要监管手段，而我国债券市场基础设施构建和维护的直接持有、集中托管体系架构能够极大程度地满足穿透式监管和风险防控的要求。据此，本文建议：一是坚持穿透式监管、直接持有；二是巩固发展安全高效的结算机制；三是坚持中央确权支持跨境互联；四是建立统一的金融基础设施；五是建立国际高标准的基础设施IT核心体系，以配合金融监管部门履行一线监测职能，构筑风险防线。

　　金融风险防控 中央登记托管 穿透式监管

　　金融风险是当前最突出的重大风险之一。与其他行业相比，金融业具有高杠杆和较为显著的社会性特征，在推高收益率的同时也容易加剧市场的波动，一旦发生风险损失，会给社会稳定和经济秩序造成重大危害。因此，防范金融风险是金融市场的永恒主题，打好防范化解重大金融风险攻坚战是当前金融工作的重中之重。

　　党和国家对防范系统性金融风险高度重视。党的十九大将防范化解重大风险作为决胜全面建成小康社会三大攻坚战的首要战役，将金融风险防范提高到前所未有的高度。党的十九届五中全会通过了“十四五”规划和2035年远景目标纲要，将统筹发展和安全贯穿中华民族伟大复兴战略全局，全会提出“把安全发展贯穿国家发展各领域和全过程”“防范和化解影响我国现代化进程的各种风险，筑牢国家安全屏障”“维护……网络、金融等重要基础设施安全”。2021年《政府工作报告》提出，要强化国家经济安全保障，并将实施金融安全战略与实施粮食安全战略、能源资源安全战略并列，作为国家经济安全保障的重要方面单独列出，充分反映出金融安全的重要意义。

　　债券登记托管结算基础设施是防范金融风险的重要抓手

　　金融体系的安全依赖稳健、高效的债券市场，而债券市场的安全依赖作为市场“管道”的债券市场基础设施。债券市场基础设施是市场的“管道”和枢纽，当“管道”平稳运行时往往感受不到其存在，但当风险发生时，其往往牵一发而动全身。登记、托管、结算是债券市场基础设施的重要职能，覆盖债券全生命周期，涉及债券和资金的运转、债券权益的确认和转移，以及交易最终目的的达成，任何一个环节出现问题，都可能导致多米诺骨牌效应。人民银行、国家发展改革委等六部门联合印发《统筹监管金融基础设施工作方案》时在新闻稿中强调：“金融基础设施是指为各类金融活动提供基础性公共服务的系统及制度安排，在金融市场运行中居于枢纽地位，是金融市场稳健高效运行的基础性保障，是实施宏观审慎管理和强化风险防范的重要抓手。”银保监会主席郭树清在《完善现代金融监管体系》中指出：“强化金融基础设施对监管的支持保障……不断提升清算、结算、登记、托管等系统专业化水平。”债券登记托管结算基础设施作为债券市场高效稳健运行的根本保障，以及防范重大金融风险的关键防线，应予以高度重视。

　　债券登记托管结算基础设施是债券市场对外开放进程中的排头兵，在保障跨境金融交易的安全与效率、维护国家金融主权方面发挥关键作用。在人民币国际化进程不断推进的背景下，境外主体对人民币债券投融资需求不断增长，债券市场开放的深化一方面有利于改善市场流动性和市场融资结构，推动人民币向国际投资交易货币和储备货币等货币国际化的高级阶段演进，倒逼境内金融市场化改革不断加快；另一方面可能助长投机套利活动和跨境资金波动，对境内金融市场构成风险隐患，因此需要强化监管，防患于未然。发达国家对开放金融市场和全球投资者的监管权力，往往是通过建立本土强大和高效的金融基础设施，以及通过中央托管结算体系的业务规则和技术平台来延伸和巧妙实现的。因此，不断夯实安全、高效的债券市场基础设施，是我国提升人民币国际话语权、维护金融安全、打造国际国内双循环新发展格局的有力武器。

　　债券登记托管结算基础设施因治乱而生。我国债券登记托管结算体制的建立基于国家对市场风险管理的要求。由于缺乏集中统一的债券托管结算体系，加之风险管理机制没有相应建立，中国债券市场曾经遭遇严重的风险事件，引发了国家金融管理部门的关注和反思，打破藩篱、改革转型迫在眉睫。在充分总结国际经验、结合我国国情的基础上，监管层下决心建立中央登记托管机构（CSD），从顶层设计推动国债集中登记托管和统一结算。1996年，经国务院批准，财政部、中国人民银行共同设立中央结算公司，并陆续发布系列重要文件1，确立了中央登记托管在我国债券管理制度中的基础地位，明确了中央结算公司在市场风险管理方面不可替代的作用。中央登记托管结算体制作为中国特色社会主义市场经济转型时期锐意改革、破旧立新的时代产物，肩负配合整顿金融秩序、防范金融风险、深化金融改革的重任，在中国债券市场蓬勃发展的关键节点上，在中国金融市场茁壮成长的风雨历程中，持续发挥着不可替代的作用。

　　债券登记托管结算基础设施制度缺陷可能引发的风险

　　如前文所述，债券登记托管结算基础设施是防范金融风险的重要抓手。但是如果其自身制度存在缺陷或缺乏适当的管理，也可能诱发债券市场风险，成为潜在的风险传播源头。有些学者指出，金融基础设施在转移金融风险的同时，也将市场参与者承担的风险汇集于自身，形成了金融基础设施自身的风险。如果缺乏适当的管理，会成为流动性错配和信用风险等金融冲击的源头，或成为上述冲击在国内和国际金融市场中传播的主要渠道，特别是成为系统性风险的源头及扩散渠道。因此，建立布局合理、功能优化、风险可控的债市登记托管结算基础设施，对于降低债券市场运行成本和风险、维护金融体系的稳定起到至关重要的作用。

　　（一）资产安全风险

　　资产安全风险是指因托管人（或次级托管人）存在无力偿还、玩忽职守、欺诈欺骗、管理不善等情况导致客户托管资产损失的风险。

　　多级托管容易导致部分证券经营机构挪用客户债券资产，带来严重的资产安全风险。在多级托管模式下，账户层层叠加，并形成若干混合账户。在制度不全、监管不严的情况下，这在客观上为二级托管人挪用客户债券及套取客户资金提供了可能性，尤其是当债券被赋予回购等融资功能后，这种动机更加强烈。历史上曾发生过大量中介机构挪用托管在公司法人席位下的客户债券、违规进行债券回购等风险事件，包括境内交易所回购风波、某国有银行利用超发国债挪用资金，以及境外不透明的多级托管导致中介机构开设混同账户、违规挪用客户证券等，充分暴露了客户资产保护的操作薄弱环节。

　　（二）主权安全风险

　　主权安全风险是指因国家间关系恶化等而冻结我方资产或使我方资产难以调回的风险。

　　以国债为例，国债作为一国主权债务，以其无风险、稳定性高、安全性好等特点，屡次在全球市场震荡中成为各种资金最为安全的“避风港”。国债不仅对金融体系的稳定起到“压舱石”作用，而且其流动性及主权信用安全是整个金融市场的生命线，在亚洲金融危机、美国次贷危机中都印证了这一点。近年来，境外机构持续增持我国国债。如果外资通过多级托管机制持有国债比重过高，则代表大量外资交易信息无法被掌握，难以监测国债资产和资金的异动情况，也无法对境外债券账户进行相应管控。例如，某些境外托管行以所谓“金融创新”规避入市监管要求，进行三方回购业务，充分暴露出非穿透多级托管的内生缺陷，以及其给国际金融机构架空监管提供的制度性空间和便利。在多级托管下，对于托管机构的内部交易、过户等诸多行为，以及托管机构之间的违规合作，监管部门都无从知晓。如果出现体外循环的现券交易或更加隐蔽、复杂的衍生品交易，一旦失控或风险暴露，资本管制政策将面临挑战，境内金融市场和人民币资产定价权的自主性、稳定性亦会遭到冲击。特别是，在当前国际形势复杂多变的情况下，一旦西方国家悍然对我国发起封锁制裁，而我方若缺乏相应的措施和抓手，那么国家金融安全的主动权必然受到影响。

　　（三）结算风险

　　结算风险是指结算无法按预期完成的风险，也即交收责任不能正常履行的风险。一般情况下，托管链条越长，涉及的中介机构越多，结算环节越繁琐，造成违约和结算失败的可能性就越大。

　　目前，欧美市场大多采取多级托管结构，交易处理层次较多、环节繁琐，人工处理率高，导致其境外结算周期过长。据统计，通过多级托管入市的境外机构的结算周期主要集中在T+2日，且T+0日占比较少；而通过“全球通”直接入市的结算周期主要集中在T+1日、T+0日。在多级托管体制下境外投资者进入我国银行间市场后，虽可享受我国市场基础设施与制度安排的高效优势，但其内部处理过程依然受自身交易处理能力所限，全面适应T+0日周期存在现实困难。因此，为便利境外投资者投资银行间债券市场，满足其交易习惯、交易需求以及资金流动性安排，监管部门不得不延长结算周期，推出T+2日、T+3日的结算周期，并提供循环结算服务以支持特殊结算周期T+N日（N≥4）的现券结算。但是，仅为迁就境外投资者而延长结算周期不仅无从节省交易成本，反而徒增潜在风险损失，也背离了国际趋势和市场规律。此外，境内和跨境结算规则不一致还会降低对境外机构的纪律约束，影响中国债券市场整体环境的稳定。

　　（四）操作风险

　　操作风险是指由于信息系统或者内部处理中的缺陷、人为错误、管理不善，或者外部事件干扰造成金融基础设施提供的服务恶化或者中断的风险。

　　在债券市场未形成统一托管结算体系的情况下，市场参与者需要按照不同券种开立多个托管结算账户，以便在多个市场进行交易。市场机构需要对内部业务系统重复投入，在技术系统、技术流程方面存在重复建设，增加了内部操作流程、操作成本和交易搜寻成本，增加了操作风险，也使得债券资产的综合使用效率大打折扣。如采用多级托管模式，投资者还需要维护多层中介机构之间的关系，与直接持有模式相比还需支付更多的服务费用。此外，不合理的市场互联设计也会增加市场负担、成本和操作风险。

　　（五）数据安全风险

　　数据安全风险是指由于系统和人为原因造成数据丢失和泄露，导致客户的隐私、财产等受到严重威胁的风险。

　　中央登记托管机构掌握债券发行、交易结算、托管等全生命周期数据，金融数据复杂多样，其安全重要性不言而喻，重要的金融市场基础设施需要高度关注数据安全。此外，金融科技的高速发展也给金融业态带来重大改变。金融科技的创新是把“双刃剑”，既有利于提高市场效率，也可能酿成重大风险。金融科技的创新使得金融风险的形态、路径和安全边界发生重大变化，网络安全、信息保护、数据安全已经成为金融监管的重要课题。数字化升级改造、新技术应用的过程带来新型风险，并呈现出与金融业务场景紧密结合的态势。这些都迫切需要登记托管结算基础设施的运行系统和设备进行安全加固，采取精细防护措施。

　　债券市场风险防范的具体措施

　　（一）坚持穿透监管和直接持有

　　穿透式（see through， look through）监管是防范金融风险的有力武器。穿透式监管是指监管部门能够及时、准确、完整地掌握实际投资者的明细账户持有情况，其同时强调“穿透”和“监管”，即“看得清、管得住”。在我国债券市场，穿透式监管的实现方式主要是直接持有模式，其不仅对债券市场投资者的身份进行识别，还能够实现对整个资金端、资产端以及资产流向的主动穿透。具体而言，中央登记托管机构为终端投资者直接开立债券账户，通过该账户穿透至底层投资者信息，并可对账户进行动态监测和相应管理。穿透式监管可以最大程度消除误报和欺诈风险，保护投资者权益，维护国家金融安全。该监管理念已上升为对债券市场和金融改革的要求。2

　　直接持有是落实穿透式管理最有效、最有力的安排。直接持有的优势在于中间环节少、操作风险小，监管部门能够掌握投资者的真实身份，把握债券和资金的真实运动情况，便于有效监管。《金融市场基础设施原则》（PFMI）指出，直接参与金融基础设施通常有许多好处，这是间接参与者无法获得的；金融基础设施建立客观的门槛要求，鼓励满足准入要求的机构直接参与。相较于境外实践，我国债券市场成立时间较晚，但债券市场基础设施在建立之初即发挥后发优势：一方面，充分利用计算机技术的先进性，构建了直接持有一级托管的账户体系，由债券市场投资者直接在中央登记托管机构即中央结算公司开立债券账户，并由中央结算公司承担债券集中托管职责；另一方面，中央结算公司成立后即在国内率先推出债券无纸化中央登记托管体制，并对遗留的实物券实行“非移动化”集中保管，结束了我国有纸债券分散托管的历史，扭转了当时因债券分散托管造成的混乱局面，维护了国家信用和金融稳定。“实名制账户+直接持有账户体系+集中托管”的制度设计，为我国债券市场营造了安全、高效的交易环境，同时也为监管部门实施穿透式监管提供了支持。

　　直接持有法律关系清晰，有利于金融投资者保护。从公法角度出发，一方面，金融基础设施是独立的第三方机构，具有基础性、公共性和不可替代性，这使其普遍具有公法授权的属性，其权威性能够承载金融投资者的信赖。特别是国债、地方债等债券具有国家信用或政府信用，其发行和交易所依托的金融基础设施的公共性不言而喻。另一方面，统一金融基础设施的设立便于监管机构直接获取交易信息，当发生纠纷时，监管机构和司法机构可以通过金融基础设施直接获取信息，投资者权益保护更为直接、便捷。从私法的角度出发，一方面，采用直接持有模式国家的相关制度法律关系简单明确，投资者权益更容易得到保护。在直接持有模式下，终端投资者持有证券的事实可以在中央登记托管机构中直接得到确认，债券上的债权债务法律关系只发生在债券投资者和发行人之间，法律关系简单明确。而在间接持有模式下，终端投资者还可能与上一层托管行产生债权债务法律关系，每一层中介之间可能都存在这样的法律关系，成为层层嵌套的托管链条。只有托管链条中的所有托管人都有足够数量的证券，最终账户持有人才具有全部权利。另一方面，在极端情况下，在间接持有模式下中间层的名义持有人破产，终端投资者的权利难以得到维护。因为终端投资者与该中间层的名义持有人不具有直接的法律关系，难以成为适格的诉讼原告。其只能向与自己具有直接法律关系的上层名义持有人主张权利，通过层层追溯权利才可以得到主张，维权效率相对较低。

　　（二）以中央登记托管体制为抓手深化金融开放

　　以中央登记托管体制为抓手，完善主权债务风险防范机制。金融基础设施通过充分、透明地掌握境内外债券市场投资者的情况，及时识别债券市场可能存在的风险或不利因素，维护我国债券市场对外开放的安全与稳定。债券市场特别是国债市场对于维护金融安全具有举足轻重的作用，坚持中央登记托管和穿透式监管是国债市场管理的基本原则。中央登记托管机构应掌握跨境资本流动的终端明细数据，支持监管部门掌握国债账户动态信息，监测和控制跨境资本异常流动，及时发现、科学分析和妥善处置金融风险。

　　坚持中央确权支持跨境互联。目前，中央结算公司以“全球通”一级账户模式、香港“债券通”多级账户模式、澳门平行账户模式全面支持债市开放，其中“全球通”是主流。由于“全球通”和澳门平行账户模式强调中央确权、直接持有，具有环节少、法律确定性高、穿透清晰等特点，得到境外投资者的普遍认同，未来应进一步推动以该模式为主的跨境互联互通。对于中小投资者等少数情况，可以在“中央确权、穿透监管”的基础上，完成账户体系的一级托管设置以及多级托管服务下明细账户的结构设置。该账户体系的设置能够穿透核查最终投资者，识别最终风险和收益的承担者，落实投资者适当性的监管要求。同时，对跨境互联业务场景中某些多级托管下非穿透的模式结构进行彻底改革，以穿透、中央确权的模式重新改造业务流程，预防风险事件的发生。

　　（三）巩固发展安全高效的结算机制

　　适度缩短结算周期符合后危机时代的重点诉求。

　　一是能有效降低市场风险。这是因为完成交易所需时间缩短，未结算的总余额减少，对手方风险敞口相应减小。同时，资金和担保品流动加快，有助于降低流动性风险。

　　二是有利于提高市场效率。为实现短周期，各类市场机构的交易处理自动化程度须大幅提升，从而提高市场效率。从国际实践看，缩短结算周期是证券结算行业的发展趋势，也是减少风险、提高效率和促进结算标准化的必要之举。3

　　我国债券市场可以从以下几方面着手，巩固发展安全高效的结算机制。

　　一是发挥境内结算周期短的优势。在管理部门的指导下，我国银行间市场早已实现T+0日、T+1日的结算周期，处于国际领先水平。一方面，电子交易平台、综合业务客户端等技术系统相对完善；另一方面，一级托管机构省去了诸多中间环节，简化了处理流程。因此，不应简单迁就境外投资者的交易习惯，而应继续巩固并不断完善自身国际领先的结算周期。

　　二是扩大券款对付机制（Delivery versus Payment，DVP）。2004年，中央结算公司的债券综合业务系统与人民银行大额支付系统实现联网运行，由此建成了使用央行货币的全额实时DVP结算机制，提高了交易效率，也根除了债券交易中的结算本金风险。在监管部门的推动下，银行间市场的债券交易全面采用DVP结算方式，截至2016年，DVP成为银行间市场唯一的结算方式，结算比例达100%。中央结算公司早已具备在全环节实现DVP的能力和条件。未来，可在实现交易DVP结算的基础上，推进实现发行环节DVP；扩大实现多币种DVP机制，进一步降低风险。

　　三是充分发挥担保品功能。中央结算公司已成为全国最大的债券担保品管理机构，建成了国际一流、先进可靠的担保品管理系统，日益成为金融市场风险管理中枢，也成为推动人民币债券资产作为国际安全公共品的重要力量。未来，应不断完善担保品违约处置机制以实现担保物权，增加银行间市场参与者的信用风险管理措施，从制度层面防范化解金融风险；扩大担保品跨境合作的目标，吸引国际中央托管机构（ICSD）、中央托管机构、全球托管行、各类交易前台及广大市场参与者，努力为投资者提供覆盖多层次、多市场、多平台的风险管理和流动性管理解决方案。

　　（四）建立统一的债券市场基础设施

　　统一的债券市场基础设施能够最大程度地满足债券市场风险防范的要求，实现安全与效率的平衡。

　　一是金融基础设施作为金融市场的硬件设施和制度安排，联结金融体系的各个部分，是经济金融运行的基础。金融市场基础设施领域与传统民商事“一对一交易”不同，具有规模化、流程化和速度化的鲜明特质，而且风险高度汇集，存在诸多特殊的运行规则，需要专门规则进行规范。统一的债券市场基础设施架构能够识别债券市场实际参与主体及其交易活动的实质，为专门规则的制定及监管决策的选择提供准确且必要的信息。反之，金融基础设施的分散式建设和管理，在技术层面上会限制穿透式监管。

　　二是对资产管理产品的底层资产和最终投资者进行穿透识别，对业务属性和实质进行穿透、认定，以及对跨行业、跨市场风险进行识别、评估和预警，都需要充分掌握和整合不同行业、不同市场的基础数据。

　　三是统一的金融基础设施还可以推进金融监管与司法审判统筹协调，促进金融市场运行透明化、体系法治化、政策统一性。

　　因此，应坚持并不断完善中央登记托管体制，逐步改变我国债券市场后台分散化的现状，由统一的机构负责整个债券市场的登记托管结算。

　　（五）建立国际高标准的基础设施IT核心体系

　　对于金融基础设施，数据化是基础，金融科技是核心竞争力。因此，债券市场基础设施应基于中央登记托管结算体制，充分利用金融科技，建立国际高标准的IT核心体系，维护市场和国家的数据安全，配合金融监管部门防范金融风险，履行一线监测职能。主要可从以下几方面着手。

　　一是完善数据治理体系建设。夯实数据要素基础，完善数据标准；明确数据治理组织架构，完善数据治理流程机制；深化数据服务，不断完善债市风险监测体系和数据模型，构建服务监管、服务市场的数据产品体系。

　　二是坚持核心系统拥有自主研发的能力。加大自主研发和开源产品掌控力度，形成安全可控、性能稳定、架构完整的统一运营平台；定期调整IT系统的建设目标和发展路线，保障系统可扩展能力的前瞻性、主动性、有效性；加强对云计算技术、数据沙箱、大数据等创新科技的支持，系统建设采用国际标准全生命周期安全管控（SDLC），实现技术平台、公共服务与运维系统自主掌控。

　　三是提高业务连续性保障能力和信息安全防护能力。完善业务连续性管理体系，提高业务连续性保障能力和信息安全防护能力；推进高水平数据中心建设，提升登记托管结算机构的业务负载能力、良好的资源保障能力和高水平容灾能力；强化安全体系加固建设，全面提升网络与信息系统安全强度，构筑风险防线。（本文为中央结算公司中债研发中心“债券市场登记托管结算问题研究”课题的部分研究成果。）

　　注：

　　1． 例如《中华人民共和国国债托管管理暂行办法》（财国债字〔1997〕25号）、《全国银行间债券市场交易管理办法》（中国人民银行令〔2000〕第2号）、《银行间债券市场债券登记托管结算管理办法》（中国人民银行令〔2009〕第1号）。

　　2． 2016年，国务院办公厅印发《互联网金融风险专项整治工作实施方案》，首次以规范性文件的形式提出穿透式监管要求。2017年7月全国金融工作会议提出，要坚持从我国国情出发推进金融监管体制改革，增强金融监管协调的权威性、有效性，强化金融监管的专业性、统一性、穿透性，所有金融业务都要纳入监管，及时有效识别和化解风险。财政部2020年发布《地方政府债券发行管理办法》，明确提出投资者应当直接在登记托管机构开立债券账户，实施穿透式管理；财政部2021年发布《地方政府专项债券项目资金绩效管理办法》，要求财政部门利用信息化手段探索对专项债券项目实行穿透式监管。

　　3． 国际金融和货币事务咨询小组（又称“国际30人小组”，简称G30）于1989年推出的《世界证券市场清算结算系统报告》，其中明确要求“所有市场……在1990年实现T+5日结算，并把在1992年实现T+3日结算作为中期目标”。2001年，国际清算银行支付清算委员会（CPSS）和国际证券委员会组织（IOSCO）联合发布的《证券结算系统建议》中也指出“最终结算不应晚于T+3日”。PFMI进一步要求“如果有必要或更好，金融基础设施应该在日间或实时提供最终结算”。

　　参考文献

　　1． 蔡达． 我国金融基础设施建设的现状、问题和对策研究[J]． 现代管理科学，2019（1）：3．

　　2．杨东． 监管科技： 金融科技的监管挑战与维度建构[J]． 中国社会科学，2018（5）．

　　3．叶林．金融基础设施的金融法解读[J]．社会科学，2019（11）．

　　4． 支付结算体系委员会，国际清算银行和国际证监会组织技术委员会． 金融市场基础设施原则[M]． 北京：中国金融出版社，2013．

　　5． Berndsen R． What is Happening in Scrooge Digiduck‘s Warehouse？ [R]． Tilburg ： Tilburg University， 2011．

　　◇本文原载《债券》2021年12月刊

　　◇作者：中央结算公司中债研发中心刘爽 祁畅

　　◇责任编辑：刘颖 鹿宁宁

　　Strengthening Financial Risk Prevention and Control with Central Securities Depository and Settlement System

　　LIU Shuang， QI Chang

　　Abstract： Risk prevention and mitigation is a constant theme of the financial market． Bond registration， depository and settlement infrastructures not only constitute a key line of defense for guarding against material financial risks in the bond market， but also provide a fundamental guarantee for the efficient and steady operation of the bond market． Systemic deficiencies in such infrastructures may trigger many types of risks， which mainly include the asset security risk， sovereignty risks， settlement risks， operational risks， and data security risks caused by multi-tiered custody． See-through （or “look-through”） regulation is an important regulatory means of preventing financial market risks． In China‘s bond market， see-through regulation and risk control are enabled largely by the direct holding and centralized depository system． Accordingly， this paper proposes the following five recommendations： firstly， insisting on see-through regulation and direct holding； secondly， consolidating and developing a secure and efficient settlement mechanism； thirdly， sticking to central ownership confirmation in cross-border connection； fourthly， establishing unified financial infrastructure； and fifthly， forming a core infrastructure IT system aligned with international standards to cooperate with financial regulators in performing monitoring functions and erecting a line of defense for risk management．

　　Keywords： Financial risk prevention and control， central securities depository， see-through regulation

　　Financial risk is one of the starkest material risks at present． Compared with other industries， the financial sector is characterized by high leverage and significant social participation． While pushing up the yield， it is likely to intensify the market volatility． Once risk losses occur， they will wreck social and economic stability． Therefore， forestalling financial risks is a constant theme of the financial market． The tough battle of preventing and mitigating major financial risks turns out to be a top priority for the current financial work．

　　The CPC and the government attach great importance to preventing systemic financial risks． The 19th National Congress listed “forestalling and defusing major risks as the first of the three critical battles waged to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects”， which elevated financial risk prevention to an unprecedented height． The Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee adopted the Outline for the 14th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives through the Year 2035， which would ensure coordination of development and security throughout the broad strategy of rejuvenating the Chinese nation． On the plenary session， it was proposed that “national security imperatives are integrated into every aspect of national development”， “China will forestall and address challenges to its modernization， to safeguard national security”， and “the security of network， financial， and other important infrastructures will be maintained”． The 2021 Report on the Work of the Government indicated that “to ensure national economic security， China will carry out strategies for safeguarding food， energy and resource， and financial security”． That financial security is mentioned separately in parallel with other critical aspects of the national economy attests to its paramount importance．

　　Bond Registration， Depository and Settlement Infrastructures： An Important Means of Preventing Financial Risks

　　The security of the financial system depends on a robust and efficient bond market， while the security of the bond market is inseparable from its market infrastructures--the pipelines that hold the market together． Infrastructures are the pipelines or hubs of the bond market， whose presence is often not felt when the pipe network is functioning well． However， when risks occur， they often produce the butterfly effect． Registration， depository and settlement， as three important functions of market bond infrastructures， cover the whole life cycle of bonds， involving the operation of bonds and funds， the confirmation and transfer of bond rights and interests， and the ultimate achievement of transaction purposes． A domino effect will take place as any of the above links goes wrong． The PBOC， the NDRC and four other ministries jointly issued the Work Plan for Coordinated Supervision of Financial Infrastructures， emphasizing in the press release that “financial infrastructures refer to the systems and institutional arrangements that provide basic public services for all types of financial activities； they occupy a pivotal position in the operation of the financial market； while offering the basic guarantee for the sound and efficient operation of the financial market， they also function as an important approach to implementing macro-prudential management and strengthening risk prevention”． Guo Shuqing， Chairman of CBIRC， pointed out in an article titled “Improving the Modern Finance Supervision System” that “it is important to increase the regulatory support function of financial infrastructures， and make the clearing， settlement， registration， custody， and other systems more professional”． In short， high importance should be attached to bond registration， depository， and settlement infrastructures， which not only provide a fundamental guarantee for the efficient and steady market operation， but also constitute a key line of defense for guarding against material financial risks．

　　As the front-runners in the drive of opening up the Chinese bond market， the bond registration， depository and settlement infrastructures play a pivotal role in ensuring the security and efficiency of cross-border financial transactions as well as safeguarding financial sovereignty． As the RMB internationalization progresses， foreign entities demonstrate the ever-growing demand for RMB bond investment and financing． On the one hand， a more open bond market can bring many benefits， which include improving market liquidity and the financing structure， enabling RMB to evolve into an international investment and trading currency， an international reserve currency， and other identities unique to the advanced stage of currency internationalization， and forcing the acceleration of the market-based financial reform． On the other hand， a more open bond market may encourage speculative arbitrage activities and cross-border capital flow volatility， posing potential risks to the domestic market． Therefore， enhanced regulation is required to prevent problems before they arise． In developed markets， the regulatory power over open financial markets and global investors is often extended and tactfully exercised by establishing robust and efficient local financial infrastructures as well as introducing proper business rules and technical platforms under the central depository and settlement system． In this sense， consolidating the secure and efficient bond market infrastructures proves a practical way to enhance the influence of RMB， maintain the financial security， and form a new development pattern that features the positive interplay between domestic and international circulations．

　　The bond registration， depository and settlement infrastructures were created to crack down on market disorders． The bond registration， depository and settlement system has been established in China to meet the requirements for market risk management． China’s bond market was ever stricken by serious risk events， due to the lack of a central securities depository and settlement system and a corresponding risk management mechanism， which drew high attention from the financial regulators and pushed them to reflect． Back then， it was urgent to break the barriers and launch the much-needed reform． After drawing upon international experience and considering China’s own conditions， the regulators were determined to establish a central securities depository （CSD）， which would promote the centralized registration， depository and settlement of China government bonds （CGB） from the top level． With the approval of the State Council， the MOF and the PBOC in 1996 co-established China Central Depository & Clearing Co．， Ltd． （CCDC）， and issued a series of important documents1 to establish the central depository as the basis of bond management policies and specify the irreplaceable role of CCDC in market risk management． As an outcome of reform and innovation， the central depository and settlement system shoulders the missions of straightening out the financial order， preventing financial risks， and pressing ahead with the financial reform． It has continued to play an irreplaceable role in the rapid development of China’s bond market and financial market．

　　Risks Possibly Triggered by Systemic Deficiencies in Bond Registration， Depository and Settlement Infrastructures

　　As previously described， bond registration， depository and settlement infrastructures offer an important means of preventing financial risks． However， if they are systemically flawed or fall short of proper management， these facilities may also trigger market risks and become a potential source of risk transmission． Some scholars point out that while transferring financial risks， financial infrastructures also pool the risks borne by market participants in themselves， and turn them into their own risks． In the absence of proper management， these facilities would become an origin for financial shocks such as liquidity mismatch and credit risk， or a primary channel for the spread of the such shocks in domestic and international financial markets； they are especially likely to turn into a source of systemic risks or a channel for their diffusion． Therefore， well-structured， functionally-optimized， and risk-controlled infrastructure plays a crucial role in reducing the operating costs and risks of the bond market， and maintaining the stability of the financial system．

　　i． Asset security risks

　　Asset security risks are the possibilities where the assets held in custody sustain losses since custodians （or sub-custodians） fall under such circumstances as insolvency， negligence， fraud， mismanagement， etc．

　　Multi-tiered custody can easily lead to the misappropriation of customers’ assets， posing serious asset security risks． Under the multi-tiered custody， accounts are placed under other accounts， to form omnibus accounts． Coupled with incomplete management and lax regulation， this makes it possible for sub-custodians to embezzle customers’ bonds and funds． Such motivation grows even stronger， especially when bonds are endowed with financing functions by repo． In the past， there were a large number of risk events： intermediaries embezzled customers’ bonds under custody or conducted illegal repos， such as the repo risk on the exchange， a state-owned bank over-issued CGBs for funds， and some foreign intermediaries used omnibus accounts to misappropriate client assets． All of these risk events have exposed the weak operational links in the protection of customer assets．

　　ii． Sovereignty risks

　　Sovereignty risks are the possibilities that the assets are frozen or become difficult to repatriates due to deterioration in relations between countries or other reasons．

　　Take government bonds for example． As the sovereign debt， government bonds have been repeatedly taken as the “safest haven” amid the global market volatility， due to their zero risk， high stability， and excellent security． Government bonds can help stabilize the financial system． Furthermore， their liquidity and sovereign credit security means the lifeline for the entire national financial market， as evidenced in the Asian financial crisis and the U.S． subprime mortgage crisis． In recent years， foreign institutions have continued to increase their holdings of CGBs． However， if the proportion of CGBs held by foreign investors through the multi-tiered custody goes too high， it means that a large amount of information on the transactions carried out by foreign investors becomes unavailable． It will then be difficult to detect the abnormal changes in CGB assets and related funds； that is， offshore bond accounts are under no regulation． For instance， a foreign custodian bank has conducted tri-party repo in the name of “financial innovation” to circumvent regulation． This practice exposed the inherent defects of the opaque multi-tiered custody as well as the institutional possibilities it provides for international financial institutions to override regulation． Within the multi-tiered custody mechanism， it is impossible for regulators to identify custodian acts such as insider trading or non-compliant cooperation． As to the spot bond transactions off the radar or more elusive and complex derivatives transactions， once they get out of control， the capital control policies will be challenged， with the domestic financial market as well as its autonomy over RMB asset pricing and the price stability battered seriously． This is especially true in the current international situation， which is complex and volatile． If， in the worst case， a country blatantly launches blockade or sanctions against China， we will have little countermeasures， and surely lose part of the ability to safeguard national financial security．

　　iii． Settlement risks

　　Settlement risks are the possibilities that settlements cannot be completed as expected． In other words， settlement obligations cannot be fulfilled properly． In general， the longer the custody chain， the more intermediaries are involved， and the more cumbersome the settlement process， the greater the possibility of defaults and settlement failures will be．

　　At present， the European and American markets mostly adopt the multi-tiered custody structure， where transactions are processed at multiple levels and through cumbersome steps， with high involvement of manual operations， resulting in a long settlement cycle． According to statistics， foreign institutions entering the Chinese market through the multi-tiered custody are largely following the T+2 settlement cycle， with only a small fraction settling on T+0． In contrast， most of those entering the market directly through the Global Connect are settling on T+1 and T+0． For the foreign investors entering China’s interbank market through the multi-tiered custody mechanism， despite their access to the efficient onshore market infrastructures， they find it hard to adapt to the T+0 settlement cycle， due to limited internal transaction processing capacities． To facilitate these investors and accommodate their trading habits， transaction needs and liquidity arrangements， they are given access to prolonged settlement cycles such as T+2， T+3， and recycling settlement in support of spot bond settlements on T+N （N≥4）． However， such a compromise does no good to saving transaction cost． Instead， it increases potential risk losses． Furthermore， the inconsistency between domestic and cross-border settlement rules will also cripple the disciplines for foreign institutions， and undermine the overall stability of China’s bond market．

　　iv． Operational risks

　　Operational risks are the possibilities of deterioration or interruption in the services provided by financial infrastructures due to defects in information systems or internal processing， human errors， mismanagement， or disruption by external disturbances．

　　In the absence of a central depository and settlement system in the bond market， market participants need to open multiple accounts for different securities types， if they want to trade in multiple markets． In this case， market entities have to make duplicate inputs to develop internal business systems as well as technical systems and processes， which complicates internal operation processes and raises costs in operation and transaction search， adding to operational risks and undermining efficiency in using their bond assets． If the multi-tiered custody mode is adopted， investors also need to maintain relations with intermediaries at different layers， and pay more for intermediary services compared with direct holders． In addition， improper market connection design can also increase market burden， costs and operational risks．

　　v． Data security risks

　　Data security risks are the possibilities of data loss and leakage due to system and human errors， resulting in serious threats to customers’ privacy and property．

　　A central securities depository holds the full life-cycle data on bond issuance， transaction settlement， depository， etc． Financial data are complex and diverse， so the importance of their security is self-evident． Major financial market infrastructures should pay high attention to data security． In addition， the fast-growing financial technology （Fintech） has profoundly changed the industry． Fintech innovation is a “double-edged sword”． It could boost market efficiency on the one hand， and cause significant risks on the other hand． Innovative Fintech has made significant changes in the form， path of transmission， and boundaries of financial risks． Cyber security， information protection， and data security， therefore， have become important issues facing financial regulators． The digital transition and the adoption of new technologies bring new types of risks， which are closely interwoven with financial business scenarios． All these pressingly require reinforcement in protection of the operational systems and equipment of the registration， depository and settlement infrastructures．

　　Measures to Forestall Bond Market Risks

　　i． Insisting on see-through regulation and direct holding

　　See-through （also “look-through”） regulation is a powerful tool to prevent financial risks． It means that regulators can capture the detailed account holdings of actual investors in a timely， accurate， and complete manner． The process emphasizes both “see-through” and “regulation”， that is， knowing clearly and exercising effective control． In the Chinese bond market， see-through regulation is enabled by adopting the direct holding mode， which not only identifies investors， but also enables active penetration of the capital side， asset side， and asset flow． Specifically， the central securities depository opens bond accounts directly for end investors， sees through the accounts to the underlying investor information， and monitors and manages such accounts dynamically． In this sense， see-through regulation can eliminate the risks of misrepresentation and fraud， protect the rights and interests of investors， and maintain financial security to the greatest extent． This regulatory concept has been listed as a requirement for the bond market and financial reform in China．2

　　Direct holding is the most effective and impactful arrangement for implementing see-through management． In addition to fewer intermediate links and less operational risks， it also enables regulators to capture the true identity of investors and the actual movements of bonds and funds， thus facilitating effective regulation． The Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures （PFMI） states that direct participation in a financial infrastructure usually provides a number of benefits， some of which may not be available to indirect participants， and financial market infrastructures establish objective thresholds above which direct participation would normally be encouraged． Compared with its overseas counterparts， the Chinese bond market was established later， but its market infrastructures have gained later-mover advantages at the very beginning． Firstly， by making good use of the computer technology， a direct-holding， single-level custodian account system was created， where investors could directly open bond accounts with the central securities depository， that is， CCDC， and the latter would assume the responsibility for centralized depository of bonds． Secondly， right after its establishment， CCDC took the lead in launching the paperless depository system， and brought the remaining physical bonds under immobilized centralized custody， thus putting an end to the decentralized custody of paper bonds in China， and maintaining national credit and financial stability． The system featuring “real-name accounts + direct-holding account system + centralized custody” has not only created a secure and efficient trading environment， but also supported the implementation of see-through regulation．

　　Direct holding has a clear legal relationship， which is conducive to protecting investors． From the perspective of public law， financial infrastructures are independent third-party institutions that are fundamental， public， and irreplaceable， which makes them reliable for investors． In particular， as CGBs and local government bonds （“LGBs”） are backed by national or government credit， the infrastructure where they are issued and traded is naturally public and reliable． Additionally， the establishment of unified financial infrastructures could give regulators direct access to transaction information． So when disputes occur， regulators and judicial organs may directly obtain information from such infrastructures， making it easier to protect the rights and interests of investors． In the view of private law， if the direct holding mode is adopted， the legal relationship is certain and clear， which results in better protection of investors． Under this mode， the fact that end investors hold securities can be directly confirmed with the central securities depository． The debtor-creditor relationship on bonds exists only between bond investors and issuers． Under the indirect holding mode， however， end investors may be involved in debtor-creditor relationships with multiple layer of custodians， between whom other legal relationship may also exist， thus forming a nested chain of custody． In this case， only when all custodians in the chain have a sufficient number of securities， will end account holders have full rights． In an extreme case where a nominal holder on one of the intermediate layers becomes insolvent， it is hardly possible for the end investor to maintain its rights． This is because the end investor has no direct legal relationship with the insolvent nominal holder， which makes it hard for the end investor to become an eligible plaintiff in lawsuits． Instead， the end investor can only claim its rights against the immediate nominal holder， with whom it has a direct legal relationship． This complicates the process of investor protection．

　　ii． Increasing financial openness with the central securities depository system

　　Improving the sovereign debt risk prevention mechanism by using the central securities depository system． Financial infrastructures are able to promptly identify possible risks or unfavorable factors in the bond market and maintain the security and stability of the market in the opening-up． The Chinese bond market， especially the CGB market， plays a pivotal role in maintaining financial security， and adherence to central securities depository and see-through regulation is a basic principle underlying the management of the CGB market． The central securities depository should have the detailed data on cross-border capital flows， help regulators keep track of CGB accounts， monitor and control abnormal cross-border flows， and promptly detect and properly deal with financial risks．

　　Sticking to central ownership confirmation in cross-border connection． At present， CCDC supports the full-scale opening of the bond market with the Global Connect direct holding mode， the Bond Connect multi-level account mode， and the Macao parallel account mode， among which the Global Connect is the most used． The Global Connect and the Macao mode emphasize central ownership confirmation and direct holding． Featuring fewer links， higher legal certainty and transparency， these two modes are widely accepted by foreign investors． In the future， it is important to promote cross-border connection using such modes． In a few cases， such as for small and medium-sized investors， it is advised to set up an account system that consists of the single-level custodial arrangement and the multi-tiered custodial service， on the basis of central ownership confirmation and see-through regulation． Such an account system is set to support the see-through verification of end investors， identify the ultimate risk and return bearers， and implement the regulatory requirements for investor suitability． At the same time， some non-see-through structures under the multi-tiered custody in cross-border business scenarios need to be rectified to ensure see-through regulation and central ownership confirmation， with a view to preventing risk events．

　　iii． Consolidating and developing a secure and efficient settlement mechanism

　　Shortening settlement cycles properly is necessary in the post-crisis era．

　　First， it can effectively reduce market risks． This is because it takes less time to close a transaction， the total unsettled amount decreases， and counterparty risk exposure is reduced． At the same time， the accelerated circulation of funds and collateral helps reduce liquidity risks．

　　Second， it is conducive to improving market efficiency． To adapt to short settlement cycles， market institutions must make their transaction processing more automatic． It can be seen from the international practice that shortening settlement cycles is an inevitable trend in the industry． It is also necessary for reducing risks， raising efficiency， and standardizing settlement processes．3

　　The Chinese bond market is suggested to improve its settlement mechanism from the following dimensions．

　　First， taking the advantages of the relatively short settlement cycles． Under the guidance of related authorities， China’s interbank market has long realized settlement cycles of T+0 and T+1， thus coming at the forefront of the world． The technical systems such as electronic trading platforms and integrated business terminals have been relatively sophisticated． At the same time， the design of single-level custody has removed redundant intermediate links and simplified the trading process． Therefore， instead of simply accommodating the trading habits of foreign investors， China should continue to consolidate and improve its leading edge in the settlement cycle．

　　Second， expanding the coverage of the delivery versus payment （DVP） mechanism． In 2004， CCDC got its integrated bond business system connected with the PBOC’s high-value payment system， thus putting in place a gross， real-time DVP settlement mechanism using central bank money． The mechanism improved the efficiency of transactions， and eradicated the principal risk in settlement． Promoted by regulators， DVP has been adopted as the sole settlement method in the interbank market as of 2016． CCDC has long obtained the capacities and conditions for applying DVP to all links． On the basis of realizing DVP settlement for transactions， it will use DVP for bond issuance． Meanwhile， it will also establish a multi-currency DVP mechanism， with a view to further reducing risks．

　　Third， giving full play to the role of collateral． CCDC has become the largest bond collateral manager in China． Relying on the world-class and reliable collateral management system， it is becoming a pivot for risk management in the financial market and an important propeller in turning RMB bond assets into an international safe asset． In the future， CCDC will continue to improve collateral enforcement in default to help realize security interest， increase credit risk management measures for interbank market participants， and prevent and mitigate financial risks at the institutional level． At the same time， it will expand the targets of cross-border cooperation on collateral， attract the wide participation of international central securities depositories （ICSDs）， central securities depositories， global custodian banks， trading venues and market participants， and strive to provide investors with the risk and liquidity management solutions covering multiple levels， multiple markets and multiple platforms．

　　iv． Establishing the unified bond market infrastructures

　　The unified infrastructures can assist market risk control to the greatest extent possible， and strike a balance between security and efficiency．

　　First， financial infrastructures underlie the operation of economy and finance， since they can link all parts of the financial system together as the hardware facilities and institutional arrangements． Unlike the traditional “one-to-one transactions”， transactions are processed in the financial market infrastructures on a huge scale in a fast and standardized way． Besides， the high concentration of risks and the existence of many special operating principles require specialized rules． A centralized framework of market infrastructures can identify actual participants and understand the substance of their trading activities， and thus provide accurate and necessary information for the formulation of specialized rules and making of regulatory decisions． Conversely， decentralized financial infrastructures will technically impede see-through regulation．

　　Second， a full access to and integration of underlying data across sectors and market segments is needed to identify the underlying assets and end investors of asset management products， to see through and identify the business nature and substance， and to identify， assess， and forewarn about risks across sectors and market segments．

　　Third， the centralized financial infrastructures can also help coordinate financial regulation and judicial adjudication， thus improving the financial market in terms of operational transparency， law-based systems， and policy consistency．

　　Therefore， the central securities depository system should be constantly improved． Decentralized back-office operation should be phased out and a single infrastructure should be responsible for the registration， depository and settlement of the entire bond market．

　　v． Forming a core infrastructure IT system aligned with international standards

　　For financial infrastructure， data-based operation is the foundation and Fintech is the core competitiveness． Therefore， the bond market infrastructures should， based on the central securities depository and settlement system， make full use of Fintech， establish a core IT system aligned with international standards， maintain data security， cooperate with financial regulators in risk control， and perform monitoring functions． The work can be done mainly in the following areas：

　　First， improving the data governance system． Feasible measures should be taken to consolidate the foundation of data elements and improve data standards； to specify the organizational structure of data governance and improve related procedures； and to enhance data services， improve the bond market risk monitoring system and data models， and to build a data product lineup that serves both regulators and market participants．

　　Second， keeping R&D capabilities and independence for the core systems． Efforts can be made to take a firm grip on the independently developed and open-source products to form a unified operation platform that features controllability and security， stable performance， and complete architecture； to regularly fine-tune the development targets and routes of IT systems to ensure the systems are scalable in a forward-looking， proactive and effective way； to enhance the support for cloud computing， data sandbox， big data， and other innovative technologies； and to adopt the software development life cycle （SDLC） security control in system development to achieve independent control of technical platforms， public services， and operation & maintenance systems．

　　Third， improving the ability to ensure business continuity and information security． It is recommended to improve the business continuity and information security management systems for improved operation； to build high-quality data centers， and enhance business capabilities， resources and disaster recovery of the registration， depository and settlement institutions； and to reinforce the security systems by raising the security intensity of network and information systems．

　　（This paper is part of the research results of the Research on the Registration， Custody and Settlement Issues in the Chinese Bond Market undertaken by CCDC R&D Center．）

　　Notes：

　　1． The Interim Measures for the Administration of Depository of the Central Government Bonds of the People’s Republic of China （C.G.ZH.Z． [1997] No.25）， the Measures for the Administration of Transactions in the National Interbank Bond Market （PBOC Decree [2000] No.2）， the Measures for the Administration of Registration， Depository， and Settlement in the Interbank Bond Market （PBOC Decree [2009] No.1）．

　　2． In 2016， the General Office of the State Council issued the Implementation Plan for Special Rectification on Risks in Internet Finance， where see-through regulation was put forth in the form of normative document for the first time． The National Financial Work Conference in July 2017 required pushing forward reform of the financial regulation system in light of China’s actual conditions， enhancing the effectiveness of coordinated actions taken by financial regulators， making financial regulation more professional， uniform， and see-through， ensuring all financial operations be included in the scope of regulation， and identifying and resolving risks in a timely and efficient manner． The MOF issued the Measures for the Administration of Issuing Local Government Bonds in 2020， which clearly stated that investors should directly open bond accounts with the central securities depository and bring them under see-through management． The MOF issued the Measures for the Management of Fund Performance of Local Government Bond Projects for Specific Purposes in 2021， which required financial departments to explore bringing special bond projects under see-through regulation using information technology．

　　3． The Consultative Group on International Economic and Monetary Affairs （“the Group of Thirty” or “G30”） published in 1988 a report titled “Clearance and Settlement Systems in the World’s Securities Markets”， which recommended that “all markets should make sure final settlement occurs on T+5 by 1990 at the latest， and take final settlement on T+3 by 1992 as a medium-term goal”． In 2001， the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems （CPSS） of the Bank for International Settlements （BIS） and the International Organization of Securities Commissions （IOSCO） jointly issued the Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems， which also indicated that “final settlement should occur no later than T+3”． The PFMI further required that “if were necessary or preferable， a financial market infrastructure should provide final settlement intraday or in real time”．

　　References

　　1． Cai Da． Research on the Status Quo， Problems and Solutions of Financial Infrastructures in China [J]． Modern Management Science， 2019（1）：3．

　　2． Yang Dong． Regulatory Technology： Regulatory Challenges and Dimensional Construction of Fintech [J]． Social Sciences in China， 2018（5）．

　　3． Ye Lin． Interpretation of Financial Infrastructures from the Perspective of Financial Law [J]． Social Sciences， 2019（11）．

　　4． The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems （CPSS） of the Bank for International Settlements， the Technical Committee of International Organization of Securities Commissions （IOSCO）． Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures [M]． Beijing： China Financial Publishing House， 2013．

　　5． Berndsen R． What is Happening in Scrooge Digiduck’s Warehouse？ [R]． Tilburg： Tilburg University， 2011．

　　Authors from： CCDC R&D Center

　　Editors in charge： LIU Ying， LU Ningning